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I. INTRODUCTION 
Like the common sense advice parents give their kids: “get it in 
writing,” the parol evidence rule generally does not permit the trier 
of fact to consider “he said, she said” testimony in a dispute 
regarding a written contract. On its face it seems intuitive—you are 
bound by the terms of your written contract. Any statements made 
prior to the contract and any oral statements made 
contemporaneously with a written contract are inadmissible to 
contradict the terms of such written contract. It is a rule of 
substantive law that results in the exclusion of extrinsic evidence. 
But sometimes there are valid reasons to look at prior written 
promises and/or contemporaneous oral promises; thus there are 
exceptions to the parol evidence rule. 
California governs the admission of parol evidence by 
codification of the common law.1 The California Code of Civil 
Procedure (“Civil Code”) provides that terms set forth in a written 
contract cannot be contradicted by evidence of a prior agreement 
or a contemporaneous oral agreement.2 The Civil Code further 
provides that the execution of a contract in writing supersedes any 
other negotiations or stipulations related to the contract’s subject 
matter.3 
 
 1.  6 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN ET AL., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 25.27 (Joseph 
M. Perillo ed., Matthew Bender 2013). 
 2.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1856(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess. 
and 1st Extraordinary Sess.). 
 3.  Id. § 1625. 
2
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2013] PAROL EVIDENCE OF FRAUD 137 
In California, the exceptions to the parol evidence rule are 
also codified. Civil Code section 1856, subdivision (f) “establishes a 
broad exception to the operation of the parol evidence rule”4 and 
allows for the inclusion of evidence “[w]here the validity of the 
agreement is the fact in dispute.”5 Civil Code section 1856, 
subdivision (g) establishes the fraud exception.6 These two 
subdivisions of the statute together allow parol evidence of fraud to 
prove the invalidity of a contract. This note will further examine 
the exception that parol evidence of fraud is admissible to prove 
the invalidity of the agreement.  
In 1935, the California Supreme Court in Bank of America v. 
Pendergrass severely limited the admissibility of oral evidence of 
fraud.7 In Pendergrass, the defendants were behind in their 
payments on a bank note, and a new secured note was executed.8 
Shortly thereafter the bank foreclosed on the secured property.9 
The defendants alleged that the bank had fraudulently induced 
them to sign the new secured note by orally agreeing to give them 
one year before they would have to make any payments.10 The new 
secured note did not contain this alleged promise and, in fact, was 
payable on demand.11 The court refused to admit the evidence of 
the alleged oral promise, holding that evidence to prove fraud 
could not be “directly at variance with the promise of the writing.”12 
This narrow interpretation of the fraud exception became 
known as the “Pendergrass rule,”13 or the “Pendergrass limitation.” 
The Pendergrass rule has been criticized, narrowly construed, and 
distinguished, but for the most part has been followed by California 
courts for seventy-five years. 
In January 2013, for the first time in seventy-five years, the 
California Supreme Court revisited the Pendergrass rule in 
 
 4.  Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Credit Ass’n, 
291 P.3d 316, 318 (Cal. 2013). 
 5.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1856(f). 
 6.  Id. § 1856(g). 
 7.  48 P.2d 659, 662 (Cal. 1935). 
 8.  Id. at 660. 
 9.  Id. at 661. 
 10.  Id. at 659. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 661. 
 13.  Year-in-Review, Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera 
Production Credit Ass’n, 55 Cal 4th 1169 (2013), 40 W. ST. U. L. REV. 265, 267 
(2013). 
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Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Ass’n,14 
a case with very similar facts to Pendergrass. In Riverisland, borrowers 
also alleged that they were induced to enter into a loan through 
oral misrepresentations made by the loan officer.15 The trial court, 
following the precedent of Pendergrass, granted the lender’s motion 
for summary judgment.16 The court of appeals reversed, but did so 
by distinguishing Pendergrass. 17 The California Supreme Court 
affirmed the court of appeals and explicitly overruled Pendergrass. 18 
Riverisland is a landmark decision which undoubtedly will have 
a widespread effect on the relationships and interactions between 
borrowers and lenders.19 Very few borrowers actually read their 
loan documents. Rather, borrowers often rely on the statements or 
promises made by their loan officers in entering into the 
transaction. Frequently, these promises are not in fact contained in 
the loan documents. After Riverisland, lenders will no longer be 
able to rely on the Pendergrass rule as a defense when making false 
oral promises to borrowers that contradict the terms in the loan 
agreements.20 
Riverisland will also impact other contracts, such as leases. In 
the shopping center business there are sometimes lengthy 
negotiations of a non-binding letter of intent prior to entering into 
a lease. Often there are terms in the letter of intent which do not 
make it into the lease. Also, landlord leasing agents usually give a 
considerable amount of information to a prospective tenant, often 
by email, which information also may not be reflected in the lease. 
After Riverisland, the trier of fact will have more opportunity to 
hear this extrinsic evidence, which will bring up issues as to the 
elements of fraud, such as whether the tenant, which may be as 
sophisticated as the landlord, justifiably relied on this extrinsic 
evidence. This is the situation in Thrifty Payless, Inc., v. Americana at 
 
 14.  291 P.3d 316, 317–18 (Cal. 2013). 
 15.  Id. at 318. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Credit Ass’n, 
119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 380, 391 (Ct. App. 2013), aff’d, 291 P.3d 316 (Cal. 2013). The 
Court of Appeal, Fifth Dist., No. F058434, reversed the trial court on the basis that 
Pendergrass is limited to cases of promissory fraud, holding that false statements 
about the contents of the agreement itself are factual misrepresentations beyond 
the scope of the Pendergrass rule. Id. This is an example of the tenuous distinctions 
which courts have been forced make in order to get around the Pendergrass rule. 
 18.  See Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 324. 
 19.  See Year-in-Review, supra note 13, at 267. 
 20.  See id. 
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Brand, L.L.C.,21 a case which followed Riverisland and which is 
discussed in this note. 
There are several elements necessary to sustain a fraud action. 
This note primarily focuses on the first step in such an action, the 
admissibility of evidence. It then briefly discusses potential future 
issues proving fraud raised by the Riverisland decision and practices 
which may be adopted by businesses to protect themselves from a 
claim of fraud based on statements not reflected in the written 
contract. 
II. HISTORY 
A. The Parol Evidence Rule 
The parol evidence rule, in general, “prohibits the 
introduction of any extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or add to the 
terms of an integrated written agreement.”22 “An integrated 
agreement is a writing or writings constituting a final expression of 
one or more terms of an agreement.”23 Under the parol evidence 
rule, “‘the terms of a writing intended by the parties as a final 
expression of their agreement cannot be contradicted by evidence 
of either a prior agreement or a contemporaneous oral 
agreement.’”24 
B. The Codification of the Parol Evidence Rule in the California Statutes 
California, which is a Field Code state,25 has statutes that 
“purport[] to govern the admission of parol evidence by codifying 
the common law.”26 The parol evidence rule is codified in the Civil 
Code. Section 1856, subdivision (a) provides that the “[t]erms set 
forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of 
 
 21.  160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718 (Ct. App. 2013). 
 22.  Julius Castle Rest. Inc. v. Payne, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839, 850 (Ct. App. 
2013). 
 23.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209(1) (1981). 
 24.  Julius Castle Rest. Inc., 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 850 (quoting Singh v. 
Southland Stone, U.S.A., Inc., 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 455, 469 (Ct. App. 2010)). 
 25.  The phrase “Field Code” state refers to states whose civil codes are based 
off of David Dudley Field’s code of civil procedure. See David Dudley Field, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE ACAD. EDITION, http://www.britannica 
.com/EBchecked/topic/206193/David-Dudley-Field/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013). 
New York enacted the Field Code in 1848, and thereafter the code was adopted in 
whole or in part by many other U.S. states, including California. See id. 
 26.  6 CORBIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 25.27. 
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their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein 
may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a 
contemporaneous oral agreement.”27 Section 1625 of the Civil 
Code further provides that “[t]he execution of a contract in 
writing, whether the law requires it to be written or not, supersedes 
all the negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which 
preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument.”28 
C. The Parol Evidence Rule—Case Law 
California case law has had a significant impact on the 
substance and interpretation of the codified parol evidence rule. In 
its application and treatment of the rule, case law in California has 
shifted considerably over the years, resulting in a shift in the overall 
reach of the rule. The case law has been across the board; from 
basically gutting the parol evidence rule and allowing the trier of 
fact considerable discretion in hearing extrinsic evidence, to being 
very restrictive in the collateral evidence that it will allow the 
judge/jury to hear. Corbin states: “[W]hile the statute is often 
cited . . . it does not seem to have had that big an effect on the 
California case law, perhaps because of its general terms. The 
provisions quoted are widely accepted, but their application gives 
courts considerable leeway.”29 
“In 1968 Chief Justice Roger Traynor . . . wrote three opinions 
that . . . eviscerate[d] the parol evidence rule.”30 But in the forty-
five years since then, the California Supreme Court has retreated 
significantly from this position, becoming increasingly restrictive in 
allowing the trier of fact to hear extrinsic evidence.31 
 
 27.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1856(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess. 
and 1st Extraordinary Sess.). 
 28.  Id. § 1625. 
 29.  6 CORBIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 25.27. 
 30.  Id. (citing Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968); Pac. Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968); 
Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto, 446 P.2d 785 (Cal. 1968)). Corbin states: 
Among these three opinions, it could fairly be said that they hold that 
evidence of collateral contracts should be introduced fairly easily, that 
there is no such thing as plain meaning, and that parol evidence 
should be freely reviewed by the trial judge and sent to the jury if it is 
‘reasonably susceptible’ of the meaning proposed for the words in the 
written contract. 
Id. 
 31.  Id. 
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In 2004, Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun affirmed the validity and 
necessity of the parol evidence rule, stating that “the parol evidence 
rule . . . results in the exclusion of evidence because extrinsic 
evidence of the terms of the written contract is irrelevant and 
cannot be relied upon.”32 The court went on to reiterate that the 
purpose of the rule is to ensure “that the parties’ final 
understanding, deliberately expressed in writing, shall not be 
changed.”33 Casa Herrera illustrates how California courts sought to 
uphold the parol evidence rule. 
In the 2013 case of Julius Castle Restaurant, Inc. v. Payne, the 
court called the parol evidence rule a “longstanding, well-known 
principle that promotes fairness and predictability by encouraging 
parties to specify the entirety of their agreements in writing.”34 
The court in Julius Castle Restaurant cited Masterson v. Sine, where 
the rule was described as a policy “‘based on the assumption that 
written evidence is more accurate than human memory,’ and ‘the 
fear that fraud or unintentional invention by witnesses interested in 
the outcome of the litigation will mislead the finder of facts.’”35 
The courts’ favoring of the parol evidence rule shows a 
willingness to support what are perceived to be fair and predictable 
outcomes. Where parties have reduced their understandings of an 
agreement to a written contract, it does indeed seem fair and 
predictable to rely only on what is contained within that written 
contract as evidence of the parties’ agreement. However, the 
courts’ strict application of the parol evidence rule may not have 
always allowed enough flexibility in cases where the facts fell 
slightly short of fraud. 
D. The Exception: Permitting Parol Evidence of Fraud to Establish the 
Invalidity of the Instrument 
There is a specific exception to the parol evidence rule that 
makes parol evidence of fraud admissible when used to prove the 
invalidity of the contract itself. Section 1856, subdivision (f) of the 
Civil Code “establishes a broad exception to the operation of the 
parol evidence rule.”36 Subdivision (f) provides that “[w]here the 
 
 32. 83 P.3d 497, 502 (Cal. 2004). 
 33.  Id. at 503 (citing 2 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE: DOCUMENTARY 
EVIDENCE § 63, at 183 (4th ed. 2000)). 
 34. 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 850. 
 35.  Id. (quoting Masterson, 436 P.2d at 564). 
 36.  Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Credit Ass’n, 
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validity of the agreement is the fact in dispute, this section does not 
exclude evidence relevant to that issue.”37 The court in Riverisland 
stated that “this provision rests on the principle that the parol 
evidence rule, intended to protect the terms of a valid written 
contract, should not bar evidence challenging the validity of the 
agreement itself.”38 The court, citing Civil Code section 1856, 
subdivision (g), which provides that “[t]his section does not 
exclude other evidence . . . to establish . . . fraud,”39 stated that 
“[e]vidence to prove that the instrument is void or voidable for . . . 
fraud . . . is admissible.”40 
The fraud exception to the parol evidence rule is a common 
sense one. A party who has acted fraudulently in inducing its 
counterpart to enter into a written contract should not be afforded 
the benefit of the parol evidence rule in attempting to defend its 
fraud. In other words, where the validity of the agreement itself is 
at issue, parol evidence can be admissible. The court’s application 
of this exception established the circumstances under which such 
evidence would be admissible. The circumstances under which the 
fraud exception would be permissible have similarly shifted in 
recent years. 
E. The Pendergrass Rule 
Seventy-five years ago in Bank of America v. Pendergrass, 41 the 
court took considerable leeway in applying the parol evidence rule 
by severely narrowing the fraud exception. In 1928, the defendants 
in Pendergrass took over a lettuce ranch that was “subject to a trust 
deed securing a note in favor of the Bank of Italy subsequently 
becoming the Bank of America.”42 The bank also held an 
unsecured note from the defendants.43 In 1932, the principal on 
both notes remained unpaid and the parties entered into 
negotiations over the unpaid notes.44 The defendants alleged that 
 
291 P.3d 316, 319 (Cal. 2013). 
 37.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1856(f) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess. 
and 1st Extraordinary Sess.). 
 38.  Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 319. 
 39.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1856(g). 
 40.  Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 319. 
 41.  Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d 659 
(Cal. 1935). 
 42.  Id. at 660. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 660–61. 
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the bank promised them (orally) that if they would execute a new 
note secured by a chattel mortgage, crop mortgage, and all the 
property owned by the defendants which at that time was 
unencumbered, “they would not be required ‘to make any 
payments on their indebtedness, either interest or principal, until 
this money came in from the 1932 crop,’” and the bank would 
extend or postpone all payments for one year.45 This oral promise 
was not set forth in the loan documents, and the new note, in fact, 
was payable on demand.46 Within a short time after the execution 
of the new note and mortgages, the bank seized all the property 
covered by the mortgages.47 The defendants alleged that the note 
was fraudulently obtained based on the oral promise to forgive 
payments for one year, after which payments would be made out of 
crop sales.48 The bank did not honor this oral promise and the 
defendants further alleged that it had no intention of honoring 
such a promise.49 
The court reversed in part and sent the case back on remand, 
holding that testimony as to the alleged oral promise of the bank 
would not be allowed on remand.50 The court reasoned that the 
alleged oral promise of the bank was “in direct contravention of the 
unconditional promise [of the borrower] contained in the note to 
pay the money on demand.”51 It further held that “the rule which 
permits parol evidence of fraud to establish the invalidity of the 
instrument . . . [cannot be] a promise directly at variance with the 
promise of the writing.”52 
Pendergrass established a strict adherence to the parol evidence 
rule in disallowing the application of the fraud exception. In 
holding that the fraud exception cannot be applied where an oral 
promise is in direct contradiction to a promise contained in a 
written contract, the court severely limited the fraud exception’s 
reach. So long as a potentially fraudulent oral statement was 
specifically addressed in the written contract, the counterparty to 
the contract could not raise an allegation of fraud. While this seems 
to reflect common sense (and clearly affirm the adage “read before 
 
 45.  Id. at 661. 
 46.  Id. at 659. 
 47.  Id. at 661. 
 48.  Id. at 660–61. 
 49.  See id. at 659, 661. 
 50.  See id. at 661–62. 
 51.  Id. at 661. 
 52.  Id. 
9
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you sign”) it may not necessarily account for inequality of 
bargaining power and other disparities between two parties to a 
contract. 
F. Reactions to Pendergrass 
Despite much criticism, Pendergrass survived for over seventy-
five years with the courts of appeal generally following the decision, 
“albeit with varying degrees of fidelity.”53 The primary ground for 
attacking Pendergrass has been that it is inconsistent with section 
1856, subdivisions (f) and (g) of the Civil Code which, taken 
together, provide that parol evidence of fraud may be introduced 
to establish that a contract is invalid, and state no limitations.54 The 
Restatement provides that evidence is admissible for the purpose of 
proving fraud, without restriction.55 Most of the treatises agree that 
evidence of fraud is an exception to the parol evidence rule with 
limitation56 and the majority of other jurisdictions follow this 
traditional rule.57 
In Riverisland, the court engages in a lengthy criticism of 
Pendergrass, ranging from the fact that “its limitation on . . . fraud 
may itself further fraudulent practices” to the “tenuous” distinction 
between promises deemed inconsistent with the writing and those 
deemed consistent.58 
“In 1977 the California Law Revision Commission ignored 
Pendergrass when it proposed modifications to the statutory 
 
 53.  Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Credit Ass’n, 
291 P.3d 316, 320 (Cal. 2013) (citing Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun, 83 P.3d 497, 
504 (Cal. 2004)); Duncan v. McCaffrey Grp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 280, 297–303 
(Ct. App. 2011) (reviewing cases); Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 
745 (Ct. App. 1989) (discussing criticism); Justin Sweet, Promissory Fraud and the 
Parol Evidence Rule, 49 CAL. L. REV. 877 (1961) (criticizing Pendergrass)). 
 54.  Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 320 (citing Coast Bank v. Holmes, 97 Cal. Rptr. 
30, 35 (Ct. App. 1971); James P. Anderson, IV, Note, Parol Evidence: Admissibility to 
Show That a Promise Was Made Without Intention to Perform It, 38 CAL. L. REV. 535, 538 
(1950); Sweet, supra note 53, at 877). 
 55.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214(d) cmt. c–d (1971). 
 56.  Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 320 (citing 6 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN & JOSEPH M. 
PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 25.20[A], at 277–80 (rev. ed. 2010); E. ALLEN 
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.4, at 245–46 (3d ed. 2004); 11 
RICHARD LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 33:17, at 632–33 (4th ed. 1999)). 
 57.  Id. (citing Airs Int’l, Inc. v. Perfect Scents Distrib., 902 F. Supp. 1141, 
1156 n.15 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Pinnacle Peak Dev. v. TRW Inv. Corp., 631 P.2d 540, 
545 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Touche Ross Ltd. v. Filipek, 778 P.2d 721, 728 (Haw. Ct. 
App. 1989); Sweet, supra note 53, at 889). 
 58.  Id. at 320–21. 
10
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formulation of the parol evidence rule.”59 In designing revisions to 
the statute, the Commission identified three cases for consideration 
by the legislature and “[c]onspicuously omitted . . . any mention of 
Pendergrass and its . . . limitation on the fraud exception.”60 The 
Commission’s proposed revisions, which were adopted by the 
legislature and which were based on Coast Bank v. Holmes61—a case 
strongly critical of Pendergrass—left the statutory exceptions relating 
to the validity of the agreement and fraud substantively 
unchanged.62 
Pendergrass also had supporters and was not completely without 
backing in the treatises and law reviews.63 In Price v. Wells Fargo Bank 
the court observed that the “broad doctrine of promissory fraud 
may allow parties to litigate disputes over the meaning of contract 
terms armed with an arsenal of tort remedies inappropriate to the 
resolution of commercial disputes.”64 A fairly recent law review 
comment, while critical of Pendergrass, nevertheless favored limiting 
the fraud exception’s scope for sophisticated parties.65 
III. RIVERISLAND 
In January 2013, the Supreme Court of California overturned 
the seventy-five year old Pendergrass rule in Riverisland Cold Storage, 
Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Association.66 
The plaintiffs in Riverisland, ranchers Lance and Pamela 
Workman, fell behind in their loan payments to the defendant, and 
the parties agreed to a restructured debt agreement (“Debt 
Agreement”).67 The Debt Agreement, dated March 26, 2007, 
pledged eight separate parcels of real property as additional 
collateral and provided that if the Workmans made certain 
 
 59.  Id. at 321. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Coast Bank v. Holmes, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30 (Ct. App. 1971). 
 62.  Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 321–22. 
 63.  Id. at 322 (citing Duncan v. McCaffrey Grp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 280 
(Ct. App. 2011); Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., 285 Cal. Rptr. 870 (Ct. App. 
1991); Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735 (Ct. App. 1989); 9 WIGMORE 
ON EVIDENCE § 2439, at 130 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981); Alicia W. Macklin, 
The Fraud Exception to the Parol Evidence Rule: Necessary Protection for Fraud Victims or 
Loophole for Clever Parties?, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 809, 812–13 (2009); Sweet, supra note 
53, at 883). 
 64.  Price, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 746. 
 65.  Macklin, supra note 63, at 830. 
 66.  291 P.3d at 316. 
 67.  Id. at 317. 
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specified payments, the Credit Association would take no 
enforcement action until July 1, 2007.68 The Workmans did not 
make the required payments, and on March 1, 2008, the Credit 
Association started foreclosure proceedings—which were later 
dismissed when the Workmans repaid the loan.69 The Workmans 
then filed an action seeking damages for fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation and asking for rescission and reformation of the 
Debt Agreement.70 
The Workmans alleged that before the Debt Agreement was 
signed, David Ylarregui, a Vice President of the Credit Association, 
told them that the Credit Association would extend the loan for 
two years in exchange for two ranches being pledged as additional 
collateral.71 The Workmans further alleged that Ylarregui 
reaffirmed these terms at the time the Debt Agreement was 
signed.72 As noted, the terms of the Debt Agreement provided for 
approximately three months, not two years, of forbearance and had 
eight, not two, parcels of real property as collateral.73 The 
Workmans did not read the Debt Agreement before they signed 
it.74 
The Credit Association moved for summary judgment on the 
basis that the parol evidence rule barred the admission of any oral 
evidence which contradicted the terms of the written debt 
agreement.75 The Workmans argued that the evidence of the oral 
promise was admissible under the fraud exception to the parol 
evidence rule.76 
Relying on the Pendergrass rule that “the fraud exception does 
not allow parol evidence . . . at odds with the terms of the written 
agreement,” the trial court granted summary judgment.77 The court 
of appeals reversed and distinguished this case from Pendergrass by 
reasoning that Pendergrass is limited to cases of promissory fraud 
(i.e., actions where a defendant fraudulently induces the plaintiff 
 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 318. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
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to enter into a contract), and that this was a case of actual fraud 
(i.e., a promise without any intention of performing it).78 
The California Supreme Court “overrule[d] Pendergrass and its 
progeny, and reaffirm[ed] the venerable maxim stated in Ferguson 
v. Koch: ‘[I]t was never intended that the parol evidence rule 
should be used as a shield to prevent the proof of fraud.’”79 The 
court noted that, prior to Pendergrass, cases “routinely stated 
without qualification that parol evidence was admissible to prove 
fraud,”80 that “[h]istorically, this unconditional rule was applied in 
cases of promissory fraud,”81 and that two years after Pendergrass, the 
court again “fell back on the old rule in a promissory fraud case.”82 
The ruling was based on the fact that Pendergrass was “plainly out of 
step with established California law” and was “an aberration.”83 The 
court reached this conclusion after a discussion of Pendergrass and 
the subsequent reactions,84 stating: 
There are multiple reasons to question whether 
Pendergrass has stood the test of time. It has been criticized 
as bad policy. Its limitation on the fraud exception is 
inconsistent with the governing statute, and the 
Legislature did not adopt that limitation when it revised 
section 1856 based on a survey of California case law 
construing the parol evidence rule. Pendergrass’s 
divergence from the path followed by the Restatements, 
the majority of other states, and most commentators is 
cause for concern, and leads us to doubt whether 
restricting fraud claims is necessary to serve the purposes 
of the parol evidence rule. Furthermore, the functionality 
of the Pendergrass limitation has been called into question 
 
 78.  Id. at 318 n.3 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1572(4) (West, Westlaw 
through 2013 Reg. Sess. and 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (defining actual fraud as “[a] 
promise made without any intention of performing it”); Lazar v. Superior Court, 
909 P.2d 981, 985 (Cal. 1996) (“An action for promissory fraud may lie where a 
defendant fraudulently induces the plaintiff to enter into a contract.”); 5 B.E. 
WITKIN, WITKIN LEGAL INST., SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 781, at 1131–32 (10th 
ed. 2005)). 
 79.  Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 324 (third alteration in original) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Ferguson v. Koch, 268 P. 342, 347 (Cal. 1928)). 
 80.  Id. at 323. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 83.  Id. at 324. 
 84.  Id. at 322–25. 
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by the vagaries of its interpretations in the Courts of 
Appeal.85 
IV. CASES AFTER RIVERISLAND 
A. Julius Castle Restaurant, Inc. v. Payne: Unsuccessful Arguments 
for the Fraud Exception Not Applying to a Sophisticated Party, 
Contracts of Adhesion, or Where There Is Disparity of Bargaining 
Power. 
In Julius Castle Restaurant Inc. v. Payne, Julius Castle Restaurant, 
Inc. (“tenant”) leased from Payne (“landlord”) a historic San 
Francisco restaurant which had been closed for almost a year.86 The 
tenant’s principal was a sophisticated restaurateur with over thirty-
five years of experience in the restaurant business.87 After 
“extensive negotiations,” the parties signed a lease and agreement 
“for the purchase of the restaurant’s assets.”88 Subsequent to the 
restaurant opening, the landlord and tenant argued over the repair 
of faulty equipment.89 When the restaurant failed after six months, 
a lawsuit ensued.90 
One of the tenant’s causes of action was based on the 
landlord’s alleged oral misrepresentations that the restaurant 
facility and equipment were in good condition and assurances that 
the landlord would take care of anything not in good condition.91 
The terms of the lease directly contradicted these alleged oral 
statements, providing that the tenant had inspected the premises 
and all improvements, and that the tenant acknowledged that the 
premises and all improvements were in good condition, order, and 
repair.92 The lease also contained an integration or merger clause, 
which provided that the lease (and contract for sale of the 
restaurant’s assets) constituted the sole agreement between the 
landlord and tenant with respect to the premises, and that any 
 
 85.  Id. at 322. 
 86.  157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839, 841 (Ct. App. 2013). 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 844. 
 89.  See id. at 845–48. 
 90.  Id. at 841. 
 91.  Id. at 842. 
 92.  Id. at 841–42. 
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representations regarding the premises not expressly set forth in 
the lease were void.93 
Based on Riverisland, the trial court admitted the parol 
evidence of the alleged oral misrepresentations, and the jury found 
in favor of the tenant on the misrepresentation claims.94 The 
appellate court concluded that, in light of Riverisland, the parol 
evidence was properly admitted at trial under the statutory 
exception for fraud.95 
On appeal, the landlord argued that “even under Riverisland, 
the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule is not applied to 
agreements entered into by sophisticated parties after extensive 
negotiations.”96 In support of its argument, the landlord asserted 
that the supreme court in Riverisland relied on authorities holding 
forth a rule that “sophisticated parties can rarely invoke the fraud 
exception.”97 The appellate court disagreed, stating: 
While the court may have cited to authorities that discuss 
a potential exception for sophisticated parties, 
defendants’ premise is unsupported by the language of 
the opinion itself. To the contrary, the court decisively 
overruled Pendergrass . . . the court did not shield 
sophisticated parties from the reach of its holding . . . . In 
our view . . . our high court sought . . . to create certainty 
and consistency by eliminating altogether the judicially 
created exception to section 1856, subdivision (g). We 
also note that the plaintiffs in Riverisland appear to have 
been relatively sophisticated business people.98 
The landlord also argued on appeal that Riverisland is “strong 
medicine” and should be applied only in “contracts of adhesion 
where there is a disparity in bargaining power.”99 The appellate 
court also disagreed with this argument, stating that “[a]gain, the 
court did not limit its holding to contracts of adhesion and we 
decline to read such a limitation into the decision.”100 The appellate 
court advised that “[i]n the post-Riverisland world, parties would be 
 
 93.  Id. at 842. 
 94.  Id. at 849. 
 95.  Id. at 852–53. 
 96.  Id. at 852 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 853. 
 100.  Id. 
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better served in addressing the heightened burden of proving 
fraud in a civil action.”101 
B. Bertino & Associates v. R L Young, Inc.: The United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey, Applying California Law, Holds 
That the Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Apply to Subsequent 
Agreements. 
In August of this year, in Bertino & Associates v. R L Young, Inc., 
the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, applying 
California law, cited Riverisland in holding that the parol evidence 
rule does not apply to oral agreements made subsequent to the 
final written agreement.102 
On July 6, 2010, Bertino and Young entered into a written 
agreement (“Agreement”) “whereby Bertino agreed to provide [to 
Young] certain consulting [s]ervices” related to the expansion of 
Young’s business (“Services”).103 The Agreement provided for a 
one-year term, renewable annually, “unless either party 
terminated.”104 Bertino alleged that he and Young had actually 
agreed to a five-year term, but that he signed the Agreement 
anyway based on oral assurances made by Mike Kurz, Young’s Chief 
Financial Officer, that “as long as Young’s expansion . . . was 
successful, the Agreement[]” would be for five years.105 Bertino 
further alleged that Kurz reiterated these same assurances after the 
Agreement was signed.106 
The Agreement provided that it would be “governed by the 
laws of the State of California.”107 It also contained an integration or 
merger clause, which provided that the Agreement was the entire 
agreement between the parties concerning the Services, that it 
superseded all previous contracts concerning the subject matter, 
and that no modification or waiver of the Agreement would be 
effective unless in writing signed by the parties.108 “On July 6, 2011, 
the Agreement automatically renewed for another one-year 
 
 101.  Id. at 852. 
 102.  No. 12-6603, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108038, at *9–12, *23–24 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 1, 2013). 
 103.  Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104.  Id. at *5. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at *19. 
 107.  Id. at *6. 
 108.  Id. 
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term.”109 On “March 23, 2012, Young informed Bertino that it 
intended to terminate the Agreement effective April 1, 2012,” and 
Young did terminate the Agreement.110 
In the resulting lawsuit, one of Bertino’s claims was that the 
term was for five years, based on the fact that Young had orally 
agreed, both before and after Bertino executed the Agreement, 
that the term would be five years.111 “Young argue[d] that the 
Agreement’s integration clause precludes, as a matter of law, any 
conclusion that the term . . . was five years” based on such oral 
statements.112 The Bertino court, citing Riverisland 113 and California’s 
parol evidence rule,114 held that evidence of the five-year term 
would not be barred at this stage of the proceedings.115 The court 
based its holding on the conclusion that the parol evidence rule 
bars evidence of oral agreements reached before or simultaneously 
with the written agreement, and this was a subsequent 
agreement.116 
C. Groth-Hill Land Co. v. General Motors L.L.C.: The Fraud 
Exception to the Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Apply Where the 
Validity of the Agreement Is Not the Fact in Dispute. 
In a case decided in July 2013, Groth-Hill Land Co. v. General 
Motors L.L.C., the defendants argued that the plaintiffs were barred 
from raising alleged oral promises which contradicted the terms of 
the written contracts.117 This case involved two plaintiffs, both 
defunct, family-owned General Motors car dealerships.118 The 
dealerships fell into financial difficulties in 2008 and became 
delinquent on their inventory loans with one of the defendants, 
 
 109.  Id. at *7. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at *19. 
 112.  Id. at *22–23. 
 113.  Id. at *23 (citing Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. 
Credit Ass’n, 291 P.3d 316, 318–19 (Cal. 2013)). 
 114.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1856(f) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess. 
and 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (“Terms set forth in a writing intended by the parties 
as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included 
therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a 
contemporaneous oral agreement.” (emphasis added)). 
 115.  Bertino, No. 12-6603, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108038, at *23. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Groth-Hill Land Co. v. Gen. Motors L.L.C., No. C13-1362 TEH, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 103039, at *47 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2013). 
 118.  Id. at *2–3. 
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Ally Financial Inc. (“Ally”), a division of General Motors.119 Ally 
provided the inventory financing to the dealerships.120 
In the promissory fraud claim, the plaintiffs alleged that one of 
the defendants, Kevin Wrate, the director of sales for Ally, made 
false oral promises to them on the phone.121 According to the 
plaintiffs, Wrate said that Ally would not terminate its inventory 
financing plan with them if the plaintiffs executed personal 
guarantees for their delinquent inventory loans.122 Such guarantees 
were to be secured by pledging certain real property to Ally and 
selling property with the proceeds going to Ally.123 
The defendants claimed that the parol evidence rule barred 
the evidence of the oral promises by Wrate, “which directly 
contradict the terms of the written agreements” between the 
parties.124 The court agreed, stating that the “[p]laintiffs do not 
attack the validity of the written agreements.”125 The court, citing 
Riverisland,126 stated that the “[p]laintiffs are correct that a fraud 
exception to the parol evidence rule permits the use of extrinsic 
evidence to attack the validity of an integrated written 
agreement.”127 However, the court distinguished this case from 
Riverisland, stating that the “[p]laintiffs in their promissory fraud 
claim do not attack the validity of [the agreements]” but instead 
“seek to recover based on promises [the Defendant] allegedly 
made to them over the phone, promises which run counter to the 
terms of the written contracts.”128 The court stated that “[t]he fraud 
exception to the parol evidence rule does not apply in these 
circumstances; the parol evidence rule does.”129 Accordingly, the 
court found that the promissory fraud claim was based on these 
alleged oral promises and dismissed the claim with prejudice.130 
 
 119.  Id. at *3–4. 
 120.  Id. at *2–4. 
 121.  Id. at *43–44. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. at *44. 
 125.  Id. at *47. 
 126.  Id. at *48 (citing Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. 
Credit Ass’n, 291 P.3d 316, 318–19 (Cal. 2013)). 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at *48–49. 
 129.  Id. at *49. 
 130.  See id. 
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D. Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. Americana at Brand, L.L.C.: Extrinsic 
Evidence Is Admissible to Establish Fraud or Intentional or Negligent 
Misrepresentation in the Face of the Lease’s Integration Clause. 
Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. Americana at Brand, L.L.C.,131 decided in 
August 2013, involved a shopping center landlord who allegedly 
made fraudulent prior written promises to a retail tenant that 
contradicted the terms of the lease. 
Plaintiff Thrifty Payless (“tenant”) d/b/a Rite Aid was a tenant 
of Americana at Brand’s (“landlord”) shopping center in Glendale, 
California.132 Prior to the development of the shopping center and 
the execution of the lease, the parties negotiated the basic terms to 
be included in the lease through an exchange of a letter of intent 
(LOI).133 The LOI stated the landlord’s per square foot estimate of 
the tenant’s probable pro rata share of property taxes, insurance, 
and common area maintenance (CAM), and estimated CAM at 
$14.50 per square foot.134 In the final draft of the LOI, the tenant 
crossed out the estimate and wrote in, “Budget to be provided to 
tenant prior to lease execution.”135 Prior to the execution of the 
lease, the landlord provided the tenant with a detailed breakdown 
of CAM in a letter which stated, “I have . . . attached our 
preliminary CAM budget for your eyes only, so that you may be 
armed with necessary explanations as to CAM costs. Please 
remember that the costs reflected are purely estimated values.”136 
The breakdown showed CAM estimated at $14.35 per square 
foot.137 The fully executed lease provided that the tenant would pay 
its pro rata share of CAM, and did not mention the estimates set 
forth in the LOI or the breakdown letter.138 The first year that the 
tenant was obligated to pay its share of taxes, insurance, and CAM, 
the tenant’s share of these expenses was more than double the 
amount set forth in the LOI and the breakdown letter.139 The 
 
 131.  160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718 (Ct. App. 2013). 
 132.  Id. at 721. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. at 722. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
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tenant sued the landlord seeking damages and rescission, and 
alleging, among other things, fraud.140 
Based on the integration clause in the lease, the landlord 
argued that all prior negotiations, including the LOI and the 
breakdown letter, were inadmissible.141 The tenant countered that 
the prior writings were admissible to show fraud, notwithstanding 
the integration clause.142 On the issue of the parol evidence rule, 
the court cited Riverisland 143 and stated that “an established 
exception to the [parol evidence] rule allows a party to present 
extrinsic evidence to show that the agreement was procured by 
fraud.”144 The court stated, 
Here, under Riverisland, extrinsic evidence is 
admissible to establish fraud or negligent 
misrepresentation in the face of the lease’s integration 
clause. Thus, [the tenant] can allege both intentional and 
negligent misrepresentations based upon [the landlord]’s 
grossly inaccurate estimates. 
Further, [the tenant] had adequately pleaded facts to 
show its reliance was reasonable given the parties’ 
previous dealings . . . and because [the landlord] had 
superior knowledge and information . . . .145 
The court held that “[t]he trial court therefore erred in 
sustaining [the landlord]’s demurrer to [the tenant]’s . . . causes of 
action for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, and [the tenant] 
should be permitted to amend its complaint to set forth additional 
facts supporting these claims.”146 
V. THE POST-RIVERISLAND WORLD 
Riverisland will undoubtedly inspire due care in regard to oral 
statements when entering into a written contract. Before 
Riverisland, loan officers eager to close more loans may have felt 
protected in making oral misrepresentations, confident in the 
knowledge that very few borrowers actually read their loan 
 
 140.  Id. at 722–23. 
 141.  Id. at 724. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at 726 (citing Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. 
Credit Ass’n, 291 P.3d 316 (Cal. 2013)). 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. at 727–28 (citation omitted). 
 146.  Id. at 728. 
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documents. Given that at least the first barrier to proving fraud, the 
admissibility of the extrinsic evidence, has now been lessened, 
lenders may be more reluctant to undertake such a practice. 
As allegations of contemporaneous oral and prior written 
misrepresentations—which may not have been admissible 
previously—will be increasingly considered, Riverisland may result 
in more cases addressing the justifiable reliance element of fraud. 
Courts may now be confronted with the issue of whether it is 
reasonable to rely on prior written or contemporaneous oral 
representations directly contradicted by, or not addressed at all, in 
the written agreement. 
The California Supreme Court in Riverisland discussed the 
difficulty in establishing promissory fraud and the requisite 
element of proof of intent not to perform.147 The court stated “[i]t 
is insufficient to show an unkept but honest promise, or mere 
subsequent failure of performance.”148 The court stressed that 
“promissory fraud, like all forms of fraud, requires a showing of 
justifiable reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentation.”149 The 
court, noting that the defendants alleged that “the Workmans 
failed to present evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue on the 
element of reliance, given their admitted failure to read the 
contract,” declined to address the issue of reliance in the first 
instance, as neither the trial court nor the court of appeals reached 
the issue of reliance.150 
The court in Julius Castle Restaurant stated that “[a] party 
claiming fraud in the inducement is still required to prove they 
relied on the parol evidence and that their reliance was 
reasonable.”151 The court noted that “[i]n the present case, the 
burden was on plaintiffs to prove that, notwithstanding both the 
Lease’s integration clause and the ‘as is’ language with respect to 
the restaurant equipment, they reasonably relied on Payne’s prior 
oral assurances in entering into the agreements.”152 
While the court in Julius Castle Restaurant rejected the 
argument that the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule 
 
 147.  Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 325. 
 148.  Id. at 325 (citing Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc., 702 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985)). 
 149.  Id. (citing Lazar v. Superior Court, 909 P.2d 981, 984 (Cal. 1996)). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Julius Castle Rest. Inc. v. Payne, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839, 853 (Ct. App. 
2013). 
 152.  Id. 
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should not be “applied to agreements entered into by sophisticated 
parties after extensive negotiations,”153 it left open the issue of how 
much weight the trier of fact may give to the relative sophistication 
of the parties and extent of negotiations in determining justifiable 
reliance.154 The court advised that “in the post-Riverisland world, 
parties would be better served in addressing the heightened 
burden of proving fraud in a civil action.”155 One of the elements in 
the heightened burden of proving fraud is whether the party 
claiming that it relied on the fraudulent parol evidence was 
justified in such reliance.156 This element takes on a different light 
when all parties are experienced in the business being transacted 
and all parties use skillful lawyers who negotiate the agreement 
over a considerable time and co-draft numerous revisions. 
Even in situations where the parties are equally sophisticated 
and where experienced lawyers conduct extensive negotiations and 
co-draft the contract, one party may have more experience in the 
particular matter at issue or may have information to which the 
other party does not have access. Under these circumstances, it may 
be justifiable for the party without such particular experience or 
access to such information to rely on prior writings or 
contemporaneous oral representations. 
In Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. Americana at Brand, L.L.C.,157 the party 
claiming fraud was Thrifty/Payless, Inc. d/b/a Rite Aid, a multi-
billion dollar company with over three thousand drug stores: 
clearly a sophisticated business operator.158 Most likely both the 
landlord and tenant used experienced real estate attorneys, with 
particular expertise in shopping center leases and CAM issues, to 
negotiate the lease. The LOI was negotiated over a three-month 
period.159 The time between the final LOI and the final lease, which 
contained a merger/integration clause, was about nine months.160 
Thus, both parties were equally sophisticated business entities 
whose experienced attorneys not only read the lease but most likely 
co-drafted it. The issue came down to Americana’s particular 
 
 153.  Id. at 852. 
 154.  Id. at 853. 
 155.  Id. at 852. 
 156.  WITKIN, supra note 78, at 1121. 
 157.  160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718 (Ct. App. 2013). 
 158.  See Rite Aid Corporation, NYSE EURONEXT, http://www.nyse.com/about 
/listed/rad.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2013). 
 159.  Thrifty Payless, Inc., 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 721–22. 
 160.  Id. 
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expertise in developing and managing shopping centers and access 
to specific knowledge about this project and similar projects built 
by Americana to which Thrifty did not have access. 
Thrifty asserted that “its reliance was reasonable based on 
Americana’s superior knowledge and experience building and 
operating shopping centers of similar size and scope; because 
Americana was familiar with the level of common area services to 
be provided, the terms of other leases contemporaneously being 
negotiated, the insurance policies to be obtained.”161 The court, 
citing Furla v. Jon Douglas Co., stated that “[a] statement couched as 
an opinion, by one having special knowledge of the subject, may be 
treated as an actionable misstatement of fact.”162 The court found: 
Thrifty had adequately pleaded facts to show its reliance 
was reasonable given the parties’ previous dealings . . . 
and because Americana had superior knowledge and 
information: Americana likely had a better understanding 
of how the property would be assessed for tax purposes 
and what insurance coverage would cost; such knowledge 
would form the basis of its share of calculations for its 
tenants, and as an owner and manager of other shopping 
malls, could better calculate the cost of running the 
common facilities. Since Americana had all or most of the 
information regarding the unfinished shopping center, 
Thrifty was not in a position to discover for itself a close 
approximation of the ultimate common costs.163 
Landlords may want to be more careful when making 
statements in a LOI or in e-mails that are not ultimately 
incorporated into the lease, but that tenants may claim they relied 
upon. In Thrifty Payless, the estimates were so far from the actual 
CAM amounts as to lead credence to the claim of fraud. Landlords 
may also want to look carefully at the language of the 
integration/merger clause. There may be ways to draft these 
clauses to give them more weight. 
Some shopping center owners have implemented strategies for 
dealing with potential allegations of oral or written representations 
made outside of the lease by having tenants sign a separate 
statement, outside of the lease, confirming that the leasing 
 
 161.  Id. at 723. 
 162.  Id. at 727 (citing Furla v. Jon Douglas Co., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 911, 917 (Ct. 
App. 1998)). 
 163.  Id. at 728. 
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representatives have not made any promises or representations 
concerning sales volumes, occupancy, exclusives, tax estimates, 
estimates of common area maintenance costs (where they are not 
fixed), and similar matters not addressed in the lease. This type of 
separate statement may be helpful to the trier of fact in 
determining the veracity of a “he said she said” claim made by a 
tenant. The trier of fact should give more weight to such a separate 
statement than to a merger/integration clause, which is usually in 
the boilerplate portion of the lease and may not be focused upon 
in the lease negotiation process. If there is a merger or integration 
clause in the agreement, any such separate statement should 
probably be dated after the date of the lease so that it is clearly a 
subsequent writing. The following is an example of what such a 
separate statement might look like in a shopping center leasing 
transaction: 
TENANT CERTIFICATION 
The undersigned (“Tenant”) has entered into a lease 
prior to the date hereof (“Lease”), with _______________ 
(“Landlord”), for premises particularly described in the 
Lease (“Premises”) which Premises are located in a 
shopping center particularly described in the Lease 
(“Center”). The business terms of the Lease were 
negotiated solely with __________ as a representative of 
Landlord (“Landlord Representative”). Tenant certifies to 
Landlord that neither the Landlord Representative nor 
any other representative, agent or employee of Landlord 
represented, promised or implied any of the following 
(except as expressly provided in the Lease): (i) that 
Tenant would be given an exclusive use in the Center, or 
(ii) that Landlord would not lease space in the Center to a 
competitor of Tenant or to another tenant with the same 
or similar use as Tenant; or (iii) that a certain tenant 
would become or remain an occupant of the Center, or 
(iv) that the number of occupants open at the Center 
would remain at a certain level, or (v) that Tenant will be 
able to achieve a certain sales amount, or (vi) that taxes 
and/or common area charges would be at a specified 
amount (Tenant acknowledging that estimates of same 
may not reflect actual amounts). 
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VII. APPLICATION TO MINNESOTA 
Riverisland has lessened the initial barrier to bringing a fraud 
case to trial in California by allowing, in more instances, extrinsic 
evidence of fraud to be heard by the trier of fact. The issue of 
reasonable reliance on that extrinsic evidence will be litigated more 
often in California, and these cases may have an impact on 
Minnesota law. In determining reasonable reliance, it is likely that 
courts will consider the weight to give an integration/merger 
clause, the sophistication of the parties, the experience and 
superior knowledge of the parties in the particular area at issue, 
and the inequality of bargaining power. Riverisland and the cases 
following or distinguishing Riverisland may impact the way the 
business community in Minnesota handles the contract negotiation 
process. Businesses in Minnesota may want to adopt new policies to 
protect themselves from a claim of fraud based on statements not 
reflected in the written contract, such as the separate tenant 
certification set forth above. 
While the full extent and impact of Riverisland remains to be 
seen, it is a pivotal case that already has affected business as usual in 
California and will likely affect business in Minnesota as well. 
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